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1. Introduction 
The topic of this thesis is medicine policy in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). With regards to time, 
it is limited to the period between the founding of the PRC in 1949 and the end of the Great Leap 
Forward in 1962. This period is significant for Chinese history, because it encompasses the founding of 
the PRC and the consolidation of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) power, and several political 
campaigns like the Hundred Flowers Movement, the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great Leap 
Forward. It is also a time in which China’s diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union underwent a 
change. While the two socialist countries signed a friendship treaty in 1950, ten years later Soviet 
leader Nikita Khrushchev withdrew all Soviet specialists stationed in China to Moscow, effectively 
ending all long-term industrial ventures with China.  
During this turbulent decade, health and medicine came to the political forefront. After founding the 
PRC in 1949, the government focused on rebuilding the country, which was devastated after decades 
of armed conflict. Reviving the economy and consolidating political power were given highest priority. 
But a strong state required more than a strong economy and a strong government: a strong people 
were essential as well. To this end, the Chinese government focused on the institutionalization of 
medicine and health care. China possessed a long tradition of indigenous medicine that functioned 
next to the style of medicine that had been imported by Western missionaries over a century earlier. 
This caused the PRC government to adopt certain attitudes towards both imported and indigenous 
medicine, expressed in media reports and national policy on the subject, as well as in the public 
opinions of government leaders.  
1.1 Methodology and Structure  
This thesis is based on three claims, made by academics. In his article “Chinese Medicine in Crisis: 
Science, Politics and the Making of TCM”, Heiner Fruehauf (1999: 3) notes two of these claims: 
1) The years 1953-1959 witnessed what appears like a remarkable reversal of Mao Zedong’s 
earlier views on Chinese Medicine.  
2) Mao sensed that China was beginning to become overly dependent on the influx of Soviet 
goods and expertise, especially in the areas of modern medical equipment and pharmaceutics.  
The first claim implies that Mao’s views, and therefore central level policy, changed over the 1950s. 
The second claim implies that Mao felt uneasy about the unequal relationship between his People’s 
Republic and the Soviet Union.  In this thesis, I will find out if there are grounds to link the assumed 
reversal of medicine policy in China in the 1950s with the changes in Sino-Soviet relations during the 
same period.  
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The third assumption central to this thesis comes from Lorenz M. Lüthi. In his book ‘The Sino-Soviet 
Split: War in the Communist World’, he suggests that: 
3)  Mao integrated international and national politics (Lüthi, 2008: 10)  
The Chairman frequently used the one to influence the other, something acknowledged by reviewers 
of Lüthi’s book as well (Vámos, 2010: 140; Roberts, 2010: 126). This claim suggests that Sino-Soviet 
events could have been of influence on Chinese national politics.  
This thesis aims to contribute to research on Soviet influence on medicine policy in China. I conducted 
research of two elements. The first element is literature research. I have studied academic sources, 
dating from the 1960s until this year (2018). These secondary sources comprise a wide array of topics, 
like Chinese medical history, Sino-Soviet relations and policy shifts. With regards to Sino-Soviet 
relations, I largely follow “The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World”, written by Lorenz 
M. Lüthi. In this book, Lüthi makes use of extensive knowledge he gained from studying a large variety 
of sources, the most valuable being primary material from Chinese, Russian, American and Eastern 
European archives. The book has generally received positive reviews (Roberts, 2010; Levine, 2010; 
Kaple, 2010; Vámos, 2010; Zhang, S., 2009; Keith, 2010; Goldstein, 2008; Pozefsky, 2010), even being 
called ”a reminder of the kind of splendid contribution one person can make” (Kaple, 2010: 144). And 
even a more critical reviewer acknowledges that “[T]he book is extremely well researched with clear 
argumentation underpinned by ample archival resources and references to secondary literature” 
(Vámos, 2010: 133). I believe that the reviews justify my use of this work as an important reference for 
describing Sino-Soviet relations. 
The second element of the thesis is an analysis of the Chinese Medical Journal (CMJ). The CMJ is an 
academic journal published by the Chinese Medical Association and should be regarded as its official 
mouthpiece. During the period this thesis comprises, the CMJ was used as a propaganda tool to display 
Chinese successes in health care and medicine (Taylor, 2004: 100). The journal, that exists to this day, 
was so prestigious that two versions were published: An English version and a Chinese version, printed 
in Chinese. I have analysed the available editions of both versions of the CMJ from 1949 until 1962, to 
substantiate and supplement my literary findings. An extensive description of this analysis can be 
found in Chapter 2. 
I structured my work as follows. The second chapter of the thesis is a description of the analysis 
mentioned above. The third provides the reader with necessary historical context. Chapter 4 discusses 
the government handling of health and medicine during the 1950s to find out if Mao indeed had a 
change of heart towards Chinese medicine. In Chapter 5 I place developments in medicine policy within 
the larger framework of Chinese domestic politics. This chapter is necessary, because an understanding 
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of the political climate at the time offers the context needed to comprehend some of the 
developments that occurred in the field of medicine. The sixth chapter of this thesis looks at Sino-
Soviet relations from 1949 to 1962. In the conclusion, I assess if this research lends credibility to a 
possible connection between PRC medicine policy and Sino-Soviet relations within the assigned time 
frame.  
It is important to address some of the terminology I will use throughout this thesis. I have distinguished 
two different types of medicine, that are now often known as Western medicine and ‘Traditional 
Chinese Medicine’ (TCM). It is important to know that these terms came into existence only after the 
two styles of medicine came into direct contact with each other when missionaries from the West 
started to practice medicine in China. Cai (1988: p. 523) identifies Western medicine as experimental 
medical science practised in the Western world after the Renaissance. This is opposed to the 
indigenous style of medicine, which came to be known as Chinese medicine. The official name for 
indigenous medicine has changed over the years, depending on the political climate. After 1949, 
Chinese medicine (zhongyi) became the standard term. The term Traditional Chinese Medicine, well-
known and widespread by now, is a political construct resulting from the wish of the CCP to create “a 
style of medicine that is recognizably Chinese, that carries the legacy of thousands of years of medical 
experience but still is able to function in a modern society, and that fits within the framework of 
modern scientific medicine” (Taylor, 2004: 98). TCM came into existence during the 1950s, and is very 
different from the indigenous medicine that developed in Ancient China. Throughout this thesis I will 
stick to the terms Western medicine and Chinese medicine, because these are the terms mostly used 
in academic sources and indicate a clear opposition.  
When writing about ‘practitioners’ of either type of medicine, I use the definitions Sean Lei offers in 
his book “Neither Donkey nor Horse” (2014). Practitioners of Western medicine are Chinese nationals 
educated in Western-style medical schools, either in China or overseas, roughly from the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century. This does not include foreign doctors and medical missionaries.  
By practitioners of Chinese medicine, I refer to anyone who practiced traditional Chinese medicine and 
lacked formal training in experiment-based medicine.  
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2. Analysis of the Chinese Medical Journal 
During the time period this thesis covers (1949-1962) two different versions of the Chinese Medical 
Journal were published: a version in English and a version in Chinese. I have looked at both versions, 
for two reasons. The first reason is the availability of materials. Below I describe which issues of the 
Chinese Medical Journals were available for me to look at. There is a large discrepancy in availability 
between what I will call the ‘English’ version and the ‘Chinese’ version. I decided to use both versions 
to make up for missing issues on both sides. The second reason is the difference in content. Although 
there is an overlap in medical topics, the content of what I view as ‘politically charged’ articles differs 
significantly. Analysing the two versions with special attention to these differences provides additional 
insight in contemporary political sentiment.  
2.1 Availability of data  
For my analysis, I used the years and issues of the English version of the CMJ that were available via 
the journal’s own website (www.cmj.org). The years and issues that were available between 1949 and 
1965 are visible in table 1. During some years, six issues were published, during others 12 issues. In 
total, I analyzed 102 issues of the CMJ. I have no explanation for the missing years 1950 to 1952, 1955 
and 1961. An enquiry about the reason of absence of these issues at the address of the CMJ has not 
led to any results. Political turmoil (consolidation of power in the early years of the People’s Republic, 
the sufan movement and the great famine resulting from the Great Leap Forward) offers a possible 
explanation for the absence of these years. However, the numbering of the volumes and issues does 
not suggest that there were no publications at all. Instead, the numbering of the volumes suggests that 
there was a volume 77 between 1958 and 1959. This indicates that there may have been publications 
in the second half of 1958 as well.  
The Special Collections of the Leiden University Library house several roles of microfilm containing 
issues of the Chinese version of the CMJ. Table 2 shows all those that were available. For an example 
of this material, please refer to Appendix 1.  In total, I looked at 62 editions of the Chinese CMJ. As 
there is no online repository of the Chinese version of the CMJ as there is for the English version, 
reasons for the lack of issues can be even more numerous. Next to the already mentioned possibility 
of no publication at all, it might be possible that the numbers are simply unavailable to me, or do not 
remain at all. 
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  Table 2 : Consulted editions of the English CMJ 
 
 
Table 1: Consulted editions of the English CMJ 
 
2.2 Step 1: Categorization 
The first goal of this analysis was to demonstrate how the issues of the CMJ published between 1949 
and 1962 are representative for both:  
- government policy in health work and medical science in the PRC between 1949 and 1962 and 
- the general political climate and development during the same period.  
Therefore, I first carried out a categorization of all of the available CMJ articles. All the examples in the 
following paragraphs are taken out of the English CMJ, but I have followed a similar course of action 
for the Chinese version of the Journal.  
As a first action, I divided all articles in the issues between the categories ‘political’ and ‘non-political’ 
by scanning through the titles and content of their articles. Secondly, I divided the articles that I marked 
as politically charged into two other categories: ‘directly political’ and ‘indirectly political’. I based this 
division on the titles and content of the selected articles. Article titles which I considered directly 
political include “Learn From the Advanced Soviet Medical Science with Resolution and Persistence”, 
“Stalin, Our Beloved Friend and Teacher” and “Living Habits and Activities of Field Rats”. Often these 
articles are reprints or translations of publications and editorials that were printed earlier in the 
People’s Daily (Renmin ribao). Other articles are about the Chinese Medical Association, often written 
by its serving president. The articles touch upon medicine, but always in relation to either political 
campaigns, policy decisions or Marxist-Leninist ideology.  
The articles I categorized as indirectly political do not have a fully political content. Neither is their 
political element explicitly visible in their title. Titles of the indirectly political articles were for example 
Year Volume Issues 
1949 67 1-6 
1953 71 1-6 
1954 72 1-6 
1956 74 7-12 
1957 75 1-12 
1958 76 1-6 
1959 78 1-6 
1960 79 1-6 
1962 81 1-12 
1963 82 1-12 
1964 83 1-12 
1965 84 1-12 
Year Volume Issues 
1953 39 7,9 
1954 40 1,5,7-12 
1955 41 1,2,4,6-12 
1956 42 1-12 
1957 43 1-12 
1958 44 1,3-12 
1962 48 7-12 
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“Venereal diseases in New China”, “Development of hygiene and health work during the first Five-Year 
Plan” and “Research in Labour Hygiene and occupational diseases – Its achievements and perspectives 
in socialist construction”. These articles often follow a similar pattern. The opening paragraph praises 
the Party or the opportunities given by the Party on the medical topic of the article. This is followed by 
a relatively technical article. In some cases, the concluding remarks mention Party leadership again. 
Other articles in this category are overviews of changes and achievements in what is titled “New China”. 
The results of this categorization as well as their percentage of the total number of articles for both 
versions are visible in tables 3 and 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 3: Political references in the English CMJ 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 4: Political references in the Chinese CMJ 
 
Comparing this rendition of political content in the CMJ with an array of academic sources on medicine 
policy from 1949 to 1962, as well as a timeline of several political mass campaigns in China during the 
same time period shows how representative the CMJ is for general political development.  
 
Year Indirect political 
references 
Direct political 
references 
Total political 
references 
As percentage 
of total articles 
1949 0 1 1 3,85 
1953 2 9 11 19,64 
1954 0 0 0 0 
1956 1 2 3 6,25 
1957 1 2 3 3,30 
1958 2 0 2 3,64 
1959 11 6 17 26,15 
1960 7 4 11 15,94 
1962 0 1 1 1,11 
1963 1 0 1 1,11 
1964 1 0 1 1,05 
1965 4 4 8 8,00 
Year Indirect political 
references 
Direct political 
references 
Total political 
references 
As percentage of 
total articles 
1953 0 4 4 17,39 
1954 3 6 9 6,08 
1955 7 11 18 10,59 
1956 5 10 15 6,98 
1957 3 11 14 6,51 
1958 5 11 16 7,02 
1962 0 1 1 0,59 
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2.3 Step 2: Chinese medicine and Soviet Union 
The first step of the analysis confirmed the reflective nature of the CMJ in relation to political mass 
campaigns and medicine policy. Continuing this assumption, there should be a similar pattern on the 
topics of Chinese medicine. This means that there should be an increase in content on Chinese 
medicine starting from the political promotion of TCM by the CCP in 1954. This increase in content 
should continue until the end of the Great Leap Forward, when political changes occur once again. In 
other words, I expect the increase to take place between 1954 (when the original medicine policy was 
overturned) and 1962 (the end of the Great Leap Forward, when more pragmatic politicians took over 
the reign of the People’s Republic). According to the same logic, it is expected to see a decline in articles 
on typical Soviet topics, articles which refer to the Soviet Union at all, and on references to Soviet 
sources in technical articles. Judging by the previous established time line, I expect the decrease to 
start in 1956 (the year Khrushchev gives his Secret Speech) and to reach a low in 1960, when 
Khrushchev decides to withdraw Soviet specialists from China.  
For the second step, I explored a possible connection between the content of the CMJ and references 
to both Chinese medicine and the Soviet Union. I counted all articles that refer to Chinese medicine in 
their titles. This included articles with titles like “Oleander Poisoning”, “Achievements of Chinese 
Medicine in Southern Song” and “Acupuncture for the deaf”. I also included articles exploring the 
possible medicinal effects of different plants and roots.  
For references to the Soviet Union, the process was somewhat comparable. I counted articles with 
titles like “Public Hygiene in the Soviet Union” and “Learn from the Advanced Soviet Medical Science 
with Resolution and Persistence”. In some cases, references to politics and references overlap, like in 
this last example. In that case, an article was drafted into both categories. In addition to this, I also 
included articles dealing with very specific medical theory that can be attributed to the Russian Empire 
or Soviet Union. These topics were painless childbirth, Pavlovian theory and sleep therapy.  The results 
of both Chinese medicine references and Soviet Union references are visible in tables 5 and 6.  
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Table 5: Chinese medicine and Soviet Union references in the English CMJ 
 
Table 6: Chinese medicine and Soviet Union references in the Chinese CMJ 
 
The results as displayed in the tables above correspond to a great extend with the trends in the 
promotion of Chinese medicine and the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations as described elsewhere. 
For the exact circumstances surrounding both topics, please refer to chapters 2, 3 and 5.  
The analysis explained above, combined with the circumstances described in the other chapters, led 
to the following conclusions:  
1) There is a correspondence between political mass campaigns and references to politics in both 
the Chinese version and the English version of the Chinese Medical Journal; 
2) References to Chinese medicine continue to increase until the years of the Great Leap Forward 
and have taken a plunge by 1962; 
3) References to the Soviet Union decrease during the second half of the 1950s, eventually 
leading to not a single mention of the Soviet Union in 1962; 
Year References to 
Chinese medicine 
As percentage of 
total articles 
References to the 
Soviet Union 
As percentage of 
total articles 
1949 0 0 0 0 
1953 3 5,36 5 8,93 
1954 2 3,85 0 0 
1956 2 4,17 1 2,08 
1957 3 3,30 1 1,09 
1958 4 7,27 0 0 
1959 6 9,23 0 0 
1960 5 7,25 1 1,44 
1962 5 5,56 0 0 
1963 2 0,69 0 0 
1964 3 3,16 0 0 
1965 2 2,00 0 0 
Year References to 
Chinese medicine 
As percentage of 
total articles 
References to the 
Soviet Union 
As percentage of 
total articles 
1953 1 4,35 4 17,39 
1954 22 14,86 9 6,08 
1955 23 13,53 15 8,82 
1956 53 24,20 15 6,85 
1957 16 7,44 5 2,33 
1958 24 10,53 2 0,88 
1962 5 2,94 0 0 
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4) Attention for Chinese medicine grows, only to decrease again at the end of the Great Leap 
Forward, while interest in the Soviet Union diminishes. This all happens over a period of a mere 
11 years.  
I believe that the conclusions from this analysis show that the CMJ can be regarded as a reliable source 
to scrutinize the intent of the PRC government concerning the politics of medicine. The analysis offers 
no decisive answer over the question of Sino-Soviet relations as a demonstrable cause for medicine 
policy change. However, it does show that the numbers of both Chinese medicine references and 
Soviet Union references undergo significant changes during the years leading up to the Great Leap 
Forward, and the Great Leap Forward itself. This opens up the possibility that the two are directly 
related.  
2.4 Points of improvement 
Although the analysis described above gives a rough impression of the situation in China between 1949 
and 1962 in reference to political opinions about the Soviet Union and Chinese medicine, this particular 
analysis can only render government inclinations rather than claim absolute certainty over these 
circumstances. The first and foremost reason for this conclusion is the fact that whole years of material 
is missing from this analysis, especially years of CMJ that assumedly were published during the Great 
Leap Forward, one of those political significant campaigns used for the first step of the analysis. If these 
years had been available, the image would have been more complete. This could have offered more 
support for the three conclusions drawn above.  
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3. Medicine in China: A historical background 
3.1 Early healing practices 
China has a tradition of healing practices that leads back until before the earliest known dynasties. 
Oracle bones dating from the Shang dynasty (~1500?-1046 BCE) that were retrieved during excavations 
are the earliest evidence of some sort of medicine. Oracle bones were usually bones from oxen or 
turtle shells. Shamans would expose these bones to high temperatures and interpret the emerging 
cracks in the bones afterwards, to find answers to questions or to predict the future. When the oracle 
bone gave a hint as to the cause of a disease, most likely an angry spirit or other supernatural entity, 
the shaman treated the patient with an exorcism or other ritual (Cook, 2013: 5). In the subsequent 
Zhou and Qin dynasties (1046-256 BCE and 221-206 BCE), healing practices and practitioners 
diversified. Next to spiritual healing, treatment with herbs, alcohol or massage came into use, as well 
as an early form of acupuncture. During this treatment, sticks, stones or needles were used to pierce 
the body. Contrary to the current form of acupuncture in which drawing blood is usually a sign of bad 
skills, original acupuncture actually required some blood loss (Ter Haar, 2009: 237).  
Although the earliest dynasties certainly were of great importance for Chinese medicine, the Han 
Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) should be noted as well. During the Han dynasty all common healing 
practices, as well as the existing but scattered theoretical knowledge were canonized in the most well-
known work on medicine in Ancient China, the “Inner Canon of the Yellow Emperor” (Huangdi neijing). 
From this moment on, theoretical terms like qi, wuxing and yinyang became the foundation of 
indigenous medicine theory (Lo, 2013: 64). During later dynasties, healing theory and treatment were 
cultivated further. Pharmacies were established and medical education was developed. Medical texts 
were published and distributed throughout the empire, helped by the invention of the block press 
(Hinrichs, 2013: 99).  
3.2 Theoretic foundations of Chinese medicine 
The most important premise of Chinese medicine theory is that it is both political and religious. This is 
because medical theory is derived from the ancient Chinese view of the world order. In this 
cosmological order, everything has its rightful place. As long as everyone remains there, all will be in 
perfect balance. However, as soon as something changes, the whole order crumbles (Ter Haar, 2009: 
99). A good example of this balance is the relationship between a ruler (an emperor, for example) and 
his subjects: as long as the subjects stay loyal to their ruler and the ruler does not forsake the duties 
given to him by Heaven, society will be in perfect harmony. As soon as either one foregoes its duties, 
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revolts break out or natural disasters occur. The order needs to be restored, often by replacing the 
emperor or by violently suppressing uprisings.  
The body can be considered a micro cosmos, in which each organ and body part has its own function. 
Yin and yang (sometimes translated into terms of dark and bright, or negative and positive) are the 
two natural forces that ensure that everything is in balance. Everything in the world can be classified 
as either yin or yang. As long as a person takes proper care of his or her body, yin and yang stay in 
balance. Therefore, a person that gets sick has not taken good care of his or her body. The yin and yang 
forces are no longer balanced out evenly. S/he may suffer from bad eating habits, emotional distress, 
or even an unhealthy environment. Yin and yang theory is often used together with another term, 
wuxing or Five Phases. These Five Phases refer to five different movements (or phases) and correspond 
to different seasons, tastes, food and organs as well. Wuxing explains the working of each organ 
through the phase that it is paired up with, and yin-yang explains how the different organs work 
together (Lozano, 2014: 13) The last term is qi. Although qi is a well-known term, it is a difficult concept 
to explain. In essence, it is a vapour that flows through the body of each human being, just like blood. 
A person’s qi influences his or her health as well. Qi can be adjusted through exercise or acupuncture.  
Usually, a physician specialised in Chinese medicine uses four ways to diagnose a patient. Through 
inspection of the body, listening and smelling, asking the patient questions and touching the patient 
(usually in the form of pulse taking), the doctor reaches a conclusion. When diagnosed with “too much 
fire”, the doctor would recommend the patient to undergo therapy to “cool down”, perhaps by taking 
a herbal concoction or consuming more foods with cooling qualities. As soon as the body cools down, 
the balance is restored and the patient cured.  
3.3 Medicine from the end of the Chinese Empire until 1949 
Although history books draw a line between the end of the Chinese empire and the start of the 
Republic of China, the development of medicine in China does not strictly adhere to this divide. 
However, medicine is (and has always been) closely related to political development (Cook, 2013: 29). 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese empire was in turmoil. Apart from a weakened Qing 
government with internal conflict, meddling foreign powers and new ideas about statecraft and social 
order also contributed to the fall of the Chinese empire. The most notable of these ideas was the 
concept of social Darwinism, that had come in from the West. In social Darwinism, the strength of a 
society is based on its power, self-preservation and the survival of the fittest. This was almost the polar 
opposite of the ancient Chinese ideas about the universe as an orderly cosmos in which morality and 
ethics play decisive roles. However, China’s situation as compared to foreign powers commanding 
trade concessions left and right, lent enough credit to the value of modern ideas (Xu, 2012: 183). The 
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idea of social Darwinism resonated within medicine: a strong state would after all require a healthy 
people (Andrews, 2014: 90, 96). Against this background, the politicization of medicine in modern 
times started in earnest.  
What began with oracle bones and exorcisms had grown into an extensive system of healing practices 
by the end of the Qing dynasty. The inability of the government to implement and enforce medical 
standards resulted in a wide array of treatments, varying in type, cost, and effectiveness (Croizier, 1968: 
34). Practitioners of medicine included pharmacists, monks, massage therapists, acupuncturists, as 
well as all kinds of quacks. When sick, an average Chinese person would most likely ask around for 
home remedies within his own social circle. If these proved ineffective, a patient would look for a 
specialist. The choice for a specialist was made based on the patient’s complaints and financial 
situation: someone from the gentry class could visit a scholarly physician, while a poor worker would 
have to make do with a concoction brewed by a granny from his neighbourhood (Wu, 2013: 174).  
The open-minded and daring could opt for something completely different. During the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, missionary physicians from Western countries had started to settle in China, 
after discovering the power of medicine for conversion. Newly opened treaty ports made it even easier 
for missionaries to enter China. There were two things that set the missionary physicians apart from 
their Chinese counterparts. Firstly, they were able to treat patients by means of simple surgery. 
Surgical treatment does not exist within Chinese medicine, so the missionary doctors could cure 
previously untreatable patients. Secondly, the missionaries opened several medical schools where 
they trained young Chinese to become Western-style physicians. By 1915, medical missionaries China 
offered 13,445 hospital beds, divided over 330 hospitals. They had established 23 missionary medical 
schools where they trained 305 students (Cai, 1988: 524). Practice of Western medicine in China gained 
the favour of modern and revolutionary thinkers, as well as reformists who hoped to usher China into 
a new and modern age. In their opinion, Western powers had clearly moved away from backward 
imperial governance and into modernity. This was illustrated by the power they held over China on its 
own territory. The modern style of medicine they practiced, based on experiments and rationality 
instead of ancient texts and superstition, was considered to be the only way forward on the road to a 
stronger and more powerful Chinese nation (Croizier, 1968: 75). 
After successfully applying Western medicine to treat a plague epidemic in Manchuria in 1910-1911, 
Western medicine gained significant momentum. Proponents of Western medicine used this 
momentum in the following years (coinciding with the fall of the Chinese empire) to deploy Western 
medicine as a tool for state building. Modern medicine would serve as the means to make the Chinese 
people healthier and more able-bodied. A healthy Chinese people would create economic prosperity. 
Prosperity would enable China to not only withstand foreign countries, but to rise internationally and 
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gain its rightful place among them. In 1915, Western-trained Chinese physicians founded the Chinese 
Medical Association (CMA). During the first Annual Conference of the CMA that took place in Shanghai 
in February of 1916, a total of 85 physicians discussed many topics, including “public health initiatives, 
the perceived duties of the medical profession, institutional reform, education of medical students, 
translations of medical texts, ethics and quackery” (The Lancet, 1916: 336, 337).   
The community of practitioners of Chinese medicine tried to adapt to modern times as well. In an 
attempt to mitigate criticism about the unscientific and backward character of Chinese medicine, the 
Chinese medical community resolved to “scientize” (kexuehua) Chinese medicine by publishing 
medical journals and books, and by founding schools of Chinese medicine. The goal of these actions 
was to make Chinese medicine less of an esoteric art and more of a science and profession. The Chinese 
medicine community originally was not as organized as the proponents of Western medicine. However, 
this changed after the pro-Western camp overplayed its hand at the First Convention of the Central 
Committee for Public Health of the Kuomintang in 1929. When rising to power in 1912, the Republican 
government had accepted health and medical practice as a state concern. In an effort to build a 
modern state structure, it promoted hygiene and public health, sponsored and encouraged scientific 
research and medical education, and maintained control over medicine practice. A Ministry of Health 
was founded in 1928 (Croizier, 1968: 53, 132). At the 1929 Convention, the Central Committee for 
Public Health adopted a proposition to abolish Chinese medicine altogether, titled “The abolition of 
old medicine in order to clear away obstacles to medicine and public health”. Within less than a year, 
defenders of Chinese medicine had successfully rallied. Representatives from 15 provinces offered the 
Ministry of Health a petition against the abolition of Chinese medicine. Not only did they succeed in 
overturning the decision, but they also managed to make sure Chinese medicine was assimilated into 
the national medical school system. They proceeded to gain direct influence on future decision making 
of the Central Committee of Public Health. The victory of Chinese medicine can be credited partly to 
their mobilization. However, it should also be attributed to the fact that Western medicine-resources 
were scarce and implementing Western medicine nationwide was too costly (Lei, 2000). The 
miscalculation of the CMA and the response from the Chinese medicine community meant a turning 
point for medicine in China. Previously, the two styles of medicine had coexisted without severe 
problems. It was only after the pro-Western camp tried to wipe out its Chinese-style counterpart that 
both sides started to present themselves as organised entities with clear political objectives.  
Despite the efforts from both medical communities, the chaotic Republican government was unable 
to regulate medicine. Attempts at catering to both systems of medicine within one society resulted in 
what Sean Lei strikingly calls a “mongrel medicine, neither donkey nor horse” (Lei, 2014).  
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4. Medicine under the CCP, 1940-1962 
4.1 Before the People’s Republic of China 
Before the CCP founded the People’s Republic of China on the first of October 1949, the Chinese 
Communist Party had already been in existence for 28 years. During most of these years, they were 
organized in the Jiangxi Soviet (1927-1934) and the Yan’an Commune (1935-1947). In the early days of 
the Jiangxi Soviet, the Communists would provide primary health care services. These services were 
initiated by doctor He Cheng (1901-1992), who would later become the first Minister of Health under 
the CCP government. From an ideological point of view, the CCP was for the most part in agreement 
with the proponents of Western medicine of the Republican period. According to CCP ideology, 
medicine should be democratic and based on science. The ancient system of Chinese medicine was 
remnant of feudal times and superstition: of no use for a new and modern China. However, the 
Communists were smart enough to realize that from their current position, it was impossible to realize 
their dream of a new medicine. Western medical supplies and properly trained medical personnel were 
scarce, especially in rural areas. Opting for Western medicine alone was unachievable. Instead, the 
Communists adopted the slogan “Cooperation of Western and Chinese Medicine” (zhongyi xiyi hezuo). 
Under this slogan, the CCP supplemented the practical shortages of Western medicine with the use of 
Chinese medicine. There were many advantages to this approach. First of all, Chinese medicine was 
practiced throughout the country. It was a system familiar to everyone. More specifically, it was 
familiar to the peasantry, the core demographic for CCP military and political support. Through the use 
of the extensive human resources that came with Chinese medicine, the CCP was able to garner 
support from and control over a huge body of people, and established a widespread medical presence 
(Lei, 2014: 224).   
4.2 1949-1953: Guiding Principles and the Patriotic Health Movement 
When the CCP commenced its rule in 1949, it encountered a country in utter chaos. With regards to 
medicine, the Party had to deal with two independent systems, each with its own support systems and 
its own characteristics (Croizier, 1968: 56). Moreover, the overall health of the Chinese people was 
alarming. Infectious diseases like malaria, kala-azar, schistosomiasis, cholera, typhus, dysentery and 
encephalitis demanded a heavy death toll. The CCP also noted a great shortage of facilities for 
maternity and children’s health (CMJ, 1953: 1-6). The government immediately sprang into action. At 
the First National Health Conference in 1950, the newly established Ministry of Health adopted three 
Guiding Principles for policy on medicine. Medicine practiced under CCP rule should (Scheid, 2013: 
242-243):  
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1) Serve the working people, especially workers, soldiers and peasants 
2) Emphasize preventive medicine programs over curative ones 
3) Aim to unite Chinese medicine with Western medicine  
Next to establishing the Guiding Principles, the CCP focused on a great variety of practical work. 
According to a speech given by Chinese Medical Association chairman Fu Lien-chang in 1952, published 
in 1953, the government performed the following tasks between 1949 and 1952 (CMJ, 1953: 1-6):  
- Vaccinating 45% of the total population, leading to a 90% decrease in cases of smallpox 
- Founding 17,835 midwifery stations and educating 127,000 midwives in modern methods 
- Bringing down occupational diseases down by almost 5% of the total disease count 
- Establishing 265 health centres, 24 public hospitals and 48 mobile medical corps in areas 
occupied by ethnic minorities 
- Developing basic health organisations, increasing public hospitals with 275.4% with respect to 
1949 
- Increasing the number of medical schools and medical students by more than 90% compared 
to 1949 
Even though the CMJ served as a propaganda tool and statistics may therefore be exaggerated, the 
variety of activities certainly shows a commitment by the government to establish a comprehensive 
health care structure.  
A third example of government action on health and hygiene was preceded by a fourth Guiding 
Principle for medicine policy, added during the Second National Health Conference in 1951: Health 
programs should be integrated with mass campaigns. The mass campaign this Guiding Principle likely 
referred to was the Patriotic Health Movement. This was a mass campaign for health and hygiene that 
originated in 1952 and would reappear in later years when deemed necessary. The Patriotic Health 
Movement arose as a result of the Korean War, where members of the Chinese Volunteer Army had 
joined the fighting in 1950. According to eyewitness accounts and media reports, the United States 
had deployed germ warfare against the Koreans. Other media reports suggested that this germ warfare 
also posed a threat to China. By now, it has become clear that these accusations were fabricated 
(Leitenberg, 1998: 189). Regardless of the untruthfulness of these allegations, the central government 
adopted the threat of germ warfare as a tool to mobilize the Chinese people. The reports, like a 1952 
article in the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao) about the spraying of poisonous insects from American 
planes (Yang, 2004: 157) were not met with overwhelming popular response. Many Chinese people, 
especially those living in rural areas, were either not very interested in stories about germ warfare in 
a faraway place, or unaware of the reports at all due to very limited access to information (Yang, 2004: 
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170), or illiteracy. The lukewarm response forced the government to adjust its strategy to entice the 
people into fighting germs. Media reports on germs increased, and the government and media 
intentionally blurred the difference between natural epidemics and those resulting from foreign germ 
attacks, thereby creating fear and anger. At the same time, the government formed the Central 
Committee for Epidemic Prevention and divided the country into different regions with specific tasks, 
running anti-germ warfare operations with military precision.  
The strategy worked: emotional investment, combined with strong institutional support, was able to 
mobilize the people into enthusiastic participation in the Patriotic Health Movement (ibid: 166-168). 
Many different activities fell under the Patriotic Health Movement-denominator. People received 
cleaning instructions for personal use and workplace and attended health education programs that 
were organized on national, provincial and local levels. They also engaged in campaigns to eradicate 
disease-carrying animals, like rats and mosquitoes. The most well-known of these campaigns is the 
later War against the Four Pests, aimed at destroying the populations of rats, flies, mosquitoes and 
sparrows once and for all (Wang, R., 2000: 270). When the Patriotic Health Movement had gained 
enough momentum, it changed from a military-like operation into a social campaign.  
4.3 1949-1953: Soviet assistance and zhongyi xiyi tuanjie 
Next to taking immediate action to create a coherent structure of medicine and health care and to 
improve popular awareness about public health practices, the CCP could afford to adopt a more 
ideological approach to medicine, now that it had properly installed its government. According to its 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy, science should serve practical needs and be accessible to the masses.  
Naturally, the same went for medicine. The Communist Party-led Soviet Union had already been able 
to establish a medical system that embodied those theoretical assumptions. It was therefore no 
wonder that the Chinese thoroughly studied the Soviet system, although the Soviet material assistance 
the Chinese government received might have helped (Lynteris, 2013: 59). In light of the fascination 
with the Western-style Soviet medical system and the long existing desire to create a new medicine 
based on science and Marxist-Leninist ideology, it was logical that Western medicine became the 
primary system of healing practise used in all the public health and hygiene efforts undertaken by the 
government. However, Chinese medicine was not forgotten. The official medicine slogan “Cooperation 
of Western and Chinese Medicine” (zhongyi xiyi hezuo), adopted in Yan’an, was changed into 
“Unification of Western and Chinese Medicine” (zhongyi xiyi tuanjie). In practice, this “unification” was 
aimed at bringing Chinese medicine up to the same level as Western medicine. Chinese medicine might 
not be so bad once all superstition and feudal tendencies were removed from it, the CCP reasoned 
(Messner, 2008: 103-107). In order to ‘scientize’ Chinese medicine, the government founded several 
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“Chinese Medicine Improvement Schools” (zhongyi xuexi xuexiao), where practitioners of Chinese 
medicine were taught the basic principles of modern science and hygiene practices. Patient recording 
and drug labelling were to be done in Western style, and Chinese medicine practitioners were to be 
licensed by means of an official examination. The government also founded a Department of Chinese 
Medicine within the Ministry of Health, and promoted scientific research into Chinese medicine by 
funding research institutes (Taylor, 2005: 37-40; Croizier, 1968: 162; Andrews, 2014: 208).  
Despite all these seemingly genuine attempts to improve, structure and streamline Chinese medicine 
along the lines of Western medicine, practice was somewhat different. The medical examination for 
practitioner licensing mainly tested Western medicine knowledge. This effectively excluded those 
practitioners of Chinese medicine that were never formally educated, but had received their 
knowledge in the form of an apprenticeship. The government also instated a system for health 
insurance, but this insurance did not cover any costs related to Chinese medicine treatment or drugs. 
This suggests that while the government wanted to give the Chinese medicine community every 
appearance of equal and serious treatment, the real reason for all its accommodation of Chinese 
medicine should be found more along the lines of consolidating control over the large body of 
practitioners and supporters of Chinese medicine rather than a belief in its therapeutic value (Croizier, 
1968: 163; Lynteris, 2013: 66). 
4.4 1954-1962: Policy reversal and folk remedies 
The year 1954 seems to mark an important turning point in the Chinese government’s view on 
medicine. Criticism first came from high up: Mao himself reportedly was unsatisfied with the speed 
with which Chinese medicine was transformed into a more scientific type of medicine (Lynteris, 2013: 
61). Mao’s dissatisfaction gave way to other criticisms as well, placing Western medicine in the line of 
fire. According to the critics, Western medicine’s view of the human body was too mechanical. When 
a patient’s arm hurt, a Western-style physician would treat the arm. If a patient’s head hurt, the head 
was treated. This was deemed wrong: medicine should also regard external conditions and the rest of 
the patient’s body. Coincidentally, Chinese medicine was the style of medicine that included those 
factors (Qiu, 1982: 50). Criticism was not limited to the theoretical foundations of Western medicine, 
but focused on the implementation of national policy as well. In 1954, the Chinese Medical Journal 
published two articles that questioned the implementation of the original policy on Chinese medicine, 
especially the part that required doctors of Chinese medicine to study Western medicine to improve 
themselves (CMJ, 1954: 11, 12). Criticism soon turned into a full-fledged campaign against 
counterrevolutionaries that secretly promoted their own bourgeois agenda. Minister of Health He 
Cheng, who had already been active in health work during the Jiangxi Soviet, was replaced. Other high-
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ranking members of the Ministry of Health were criticized as well. In 1955, the Chinese Medical Journal 
published three editorials criticizing Vice Minister of Health Wang Bin, with titles like  “Criticism of 
scholar/physician Wang Bin’s discrimination against Chinese medicine and his bourgeois thinking” and 
“Wang Bin’s bourgeoisie in health and hygiene work” (CMJ, 1955). Wang had proposed to abolish 
Chinese medicine in 1953, and paid the price for his initiative soon after. 
The small-scale purge of the Ministry of Health was followed by a marked change in policy. The official 
slogan was changed once again, from “Unification of Western and Chinese Medicine” (zhongyi xiyi 
tuanjie) into “Integration of Western and Chinese Medicine” (zhongyi xiyi jiehe). Apparently, Chinese 
medicine was now ready to be fully integrated with Western medicine. To effectuate this integration, 
the government opened the Beijing Research Academy of Chinese Medicine (zhongyi yanjiuyuan) in 
1955: The most advanced research centre for Chinese medicine yet. The Ministry of Health also 
required all medical education institutions to officially adopt Chinese medicine-related courses into 
their curricula. The “Chinese Medicine Improvement Schools” were changed into facilities where 
Western-educated physicians could learn about Chinese medicine (Taylor, 2005: 72).  
All these measures lead to a reversal of the earlier policy, in which Western-style medicine was more 
dominant than Chinese medicine. Reasons for this sudden change are not completely clear, Bridie 
Andrews (2014) writes. However, she thinks that a need to deploy medical personnel more effectively; 
a wish to avoid social unrest within the Chinese medicine community and a growing sense of natural 
pride may be explanations for the political rehabilitation of Chinese medicine. From 1954 until the end 
of the Great Leap Forward in 1961, Chinese medicine, especially home remedies, came more and more 
into the spotlight. The government adopted the view that the masses offered a great untapped 
potential for healing practices. A growing official interest in folk remedies led to a number of unusual 
health practices, like the use of acupuncture to cure deafness and injecting humans with chicken blood 
using hypodermic needles to strengthen the body (Chee, 2018: 196). Over the years of the Great Leap 
Forward, the interest in Chinese medicine and the participation of the masses in health and healing 
practices peaked, stimulated by both the pressure to come up with more and better cures and 
treatments and by the shortage of Western medical facilities. During this period, the War Against the 
Four Pests took place, and the government carried out extensive research and preventive treatment 
of schistosomiasis, a parasitic disease that had claimed many victims for years. During the campaigns 
to wipe out schistosomiasis, reportedly a personal wish of Mao, people engaged in several preventive 
activities to fight the disease. They buried snails (the carriers of the disease), filled in irrigation canals 
completely and dug new irrigation canals and engaged in land reclamation projects in marshy terrain 
(Bowers et al, 1988: 131).  
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4.5 Reflections in the Chinese Medical Journal 
This policy change and trend of increased interest in Chinese medicine and folk remedies resonates in 
the Medical Journal. The percentage of Chinese medicine articles in the CMJ rose significantly between 
1953 (4,35%) and 1954 (14,86%), when the change in medicine policy occurred. The percentage stays 
relatively high throughout the 1950s, but drops somewhere between 1958 and 1962, reaching 2,94% 
in the last year. Unfortunately it is harder to show if the trend in Chinese medicine articles is the same 
in the Great Leap Forward, due to the unavailability of CMJs from 1959 and 1960.  
The English version of the CMJ shows a slightly different image. There had always been less articles on 
Chinese medicine in the English version of the CMJ, most likely because the Chinese Medical 
Association and CCP wanted to portray an image of advanced science to foreign readers.  In the English 
version of the Journal, in 1957 3,30% of all articles dealt with Chinese medicine. The following year, 
that percentage had doubled to 7,27%. In 1960, the percentage had risen to 9,23%. During the 
aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, the number of articles decreased, hitting 0,69% in 1963. For a 
complete overview of all percentages, please refer to Chapter 2.  
Just as the number of articles on Chinese medicine changes between 1954 and 1962, so does the 
content and tone of the articles. This is especially visible in the English version of the CMJ. In the earlier 
years of 1953 and 1954, four out of five articles on Chinese medicine are written by the historian Li 
Tao, and discuss only the history of Chinese medicine in different dynasties. In 1956 however, an article 
about the use of pumpkin seeds and areca nuts to treat tapeworm infections appears. By 1959, the 
historical articles have ended. From that moment on, the articles on Chinese medicine become focused 
on the therapeutic value of acupuncture and moxibustion and native herbs. One of the most famous 
activities of the Patriotic Health Campaign, the War Against the Four Pests, also made an appearance 
in the Chinese Medical Journal. In February 1959, the CMJ published an article titled “Living habits and 
activities of field rats”. The article consists largely of a speech given by a woman from the Yi ethnic 
minority, who was interviewed because of her incredible talent for catching and killing rats. In the 
article, the woman explains how to spot a rat hole and how to catch and kill the animals (CMJ, 1959: 
144-147). By 1960, however, the claims become somewhat difficult to believe. In February of that year, 
it is suggested that clinical trials have pointed out that acupuncture can be used as an effective means 
to treat acute appendicitis (CMJ, 1960: 103-108). After 1962, however, articles mainly focus on the 
sedative effects of acupuncture and the use of Chinese medicine for the healing of bone fractures (CMJ, 
1964). With regards to content and tone, the Chinese version of the CMJ diverges again from the 
English version. Contrary to the shift in tone and content in the English CMJ, the articles in the Chinese 
CMJ stay relatively similar. Most articles focus on the medicinal uses of native herbs and plants and 
the use of acupuncture.  
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It is interesting to note as well that the term ‘Chinese medicine’ is changed into ‘Traditional Chinese 
Medicine’. Taylor (2004: 101) has analysed this and notes that the term Traditional Chinese Medicine 
(TCM) starts appearing in 1958. According to Taylor, this means that the Chinese government was 
ready to present its new form of Chinese medicine to the outside world. TCM was the best of native 
Chinese healing practices, without its superstitious tendencies and therefore ready to be used in 
modern society. The word ‘traditional’ indicates that the medical system embodies the experiences of 
centuries of healing practices. Although it was represented as traditional, ancient and maybe even 
somewhat mysterious, it hardly resembled the healing practices that were still present at the end of 
the Qing dynasty. Instead, Chinese medicine was formed along professional lines, making it a 
professional and well-organized system. TCM is the system of Chinese medicine that has spread around 
the globe and that we all know now.  
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5. Political developments in China and medicine 
To understand developments in the field of medicine policy in China from 1949 to 1962, it is important 
to look at these developments within the larger context of political development in China during the 
same period. This context makes it easier to understand the political environment of the time, and it 
offers possible causes for policy decisions, including those in the field of medicine.  
I look at the political trajectory of China during this time period from two different angles. The first 
angle is political campaigns. A deeper dive into political campaigns shows how these campaigns, 
usually encompassing all policy terrains, were directly translated into action within the field of 
medicine. The second angle is based on ideological radicalization and the theory of policy shifts in China 
as described by Richard Suttmeier in his 1974 book “Research and Revolution”. Looking at political 
developments from the perspective of ideological radicalization and policy shifts offers more insight 
into the fundamental ideas that dominated policy in all terrains, including medicine.  
5.1 Political mass campaigns: Emotion work 
In the previous chapter, the Patriotic Health Movement was already mentioned. This movement is a 
good example of the mass campaigns that were carried out by the government during the 1950s. The 
Patriotic Health Movement ensured the commitment of the masses to improve the general health of 
the Chinese people throughout the country. The Movement’s success can be attributed to fulfilling the 
two criteria that Elizabeth Perry (2002) deems necessary for successful mobilization of a large body of 
people: strong institutional support and emotional investment. 
The CCP recognized the power of emotions well before the Patriotic Health Movement. The CCP 
already started practicing ‘emotion work’ before the foundation of the PRC in 1949, to entice peasants 
into standing up against repressive landowners and supporting the Communist cause. After the PRC 
was established, this emotion work continued. The CCP oversaw highly orchestrated mass meetings 
during which landowners were criticized. Everything about these meetings was decided beforehand: 
who would sit where, what songs would be sung and how long speeches would be. All these 
precautions were taken to ensure the largest possible emotional response from the participants (Perry, 
2002: 117). The CCP recognized the power of the masses like no other and continuously ‘activated’ the 
people to reach political goals, like the implementation of certain policy. At the same time, political 
mass campaigns offered an opportunity for the CCP to gain more access to the population, especially 
the rural population. This access allowed the CCP to strengthen its control over the people.  That 
achieving political goals and controlling people are the most important objectives of mass mobilization, 
will become apparent in the following examples of political campaigns.  
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This chapter will only look at those campaigns that are relevant to medical policy and the medical 
community. To determine which campaigns meet that criterion, I have looked at two things. Firstly, I 
chose political campaigns that were aimed at intellectuals. Scientists, including medical scientists, were 
part of this target group. Secondly, I have checked political references in the CMJ. If a political campaign 
is referred to in the CMJ, the influence of that campaign most likely extended to the medical world. As 
a result, the political campaigns that are most relevant for the development of medicine are the Sufan 
Movement (1955-1956), the Hundred Flowers Campaign (1956-1957), the Anti Rightist Movement 
(1957-1959) and the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961).  
5.2 The Sufan Movement (1955-1956)  
The goal of the Sufan Movement (sufan yundong) was to rid the CCP from all counterrevolutionaries 
still hidden within party ranks. According to official directives, secret Kuomintang supporters were 
undermining CCP policy from the inside. During mass meetings, alleged counterrevolutionaries were 
forced to confess to their crimes. It is not sure whether all the victims of the Sufan Movement were 
actual counterrevolutionaries. The movement might also have been a ruse to punish officials that did 
not follow Party instructions to the letter, or to remove those who were underperforming (Baum, 1964: 
1051). The Sufan Movement was reflected in the Chinese Medical Journal: in July 1955, the Journal 
started with two editorials on the crimes of Hu Feng and the CCP’s determination to smoke out all 
hidden counterrevolutionaries. Hu Feng was a writer who had expressed criticism of the regime in 
1954 and was arrested as a counterrevolutionary in 1955. The field of medicine was not immune to 
this campaign neither. The changes in personnel and policy in the Ministry of Health and took place 
only a year before the Sufan Movement, and the political campaign offered a great opportunity for 
criticism of former higher-ups in the Ministry. In 1955 and 1956, the CMJ published several articles 
criticizing former Minister of Health He Cheng and Vice Minister of Health Wang Bin. Titles of these 
articles include “Criticism of Wang Bin’s bourgeoisie in health and hygiene work”, and “Criticism of He 
Cheng’s implementation of Chinese medicine policy”. It is striking that these critical articles were only 
published in the Chinese language-version of the CMJ, not in the English version. This again points to 
the way in which the English version was used to create a certain image for foreign readers. It is not 
exactly clear how many victims the Sufan Movement claimed, but estimates range from 500,000 to 
800,000 (Dillon, 2013: 301).  
5.3 The Hundred Flowers Campaign (1956-1957) 
By 1956, economic progress in China fell behind in comparison to earlier projections. Mao realized that 
initiatives for an economic boost would most likely come from the country’s intelligentsia. In order to 
bolster their creativity, he would have to relax the government’s control over them, and encourage 
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debates about economic and societal progress. When he announced the Hundred Flowers Campaign 
(baihua yundong) in May 1956, he encouraged China’s intellectuals to express constructive criticism of 
the Party. Although initial response was guarded, some very critical articles were published a year later. 
Dissatisfaction with bureaucracy and corruption was not uncommon. Scientists especially complained 
about the fact that they were not allowed to carry out as much research as they would like (Lynteris, 
2013: 60). Both the Chinese and English version of the CMJ contributed by publishing articles on issues 
that had arisen concerning the new policy of Western doctors studying Chinese medicine, as well as 
on medical responsibility and on the importance of research for strengthening hygiene work 
throughout the country (CMJ, 1956).  
5.4 The Anti-Rightist Movement (1957-1959) 
The mass response to the Hundred Flowers Movement and the lashing of criticism supposedly came 
as a shock to Mao. He had not calculated that popular response to his call for improvement would be 
so critical of the Party. As a response, he announced the end of the Hundred Flowers Campaign a year 
after it had started and commenced the Anti-Rightist Campaign (fan youpai yundong). Later, Mao 
would claim that the Hundred Flowers Campaign had been a clever ruse to identify bourgeois elements, 
or rightists. The Anti-Rightist Campaign, that lasted two years, was aimed at wiping out all critics of the 
Party through severe persecution. Those who had spoken up during the Hundred Flowers Campaign 
(just like Mao had asked them to do) were purged in its wake. Once a person was branded a rightist 
element, he or she and their families would carry that label for years to come. This brand severely 
deteriorated anyone’s social status. Next to the official humiliation, the critics were sent to labour 
camps in the countryside to participate in a thought reform process (Perry, 2002: 118). The Anti-
Rightist Campaign took a heavy toll on the intellectual community, because many of the Party’s critics 
were in fact intellectuals. The Hundred Flowers Campaign proved to Mao that ‘intellectual’ and 
‘bourgeois’ were almost similar in meaning. Because of their bourgeois tendencies, intellectuals posed 
a threat to the government and could not be trusted. The CMJ shows how fast the transition from 
Hundred Flowers Campaign to Anti-Rightist Campaign took place. In May 1957, the CMJ published an 
article on the importance of research for medical science. Only three months later, in August of the 
same year, the CMJ started with no less than three political editorials. The first article was titled “We 
Must Fight Rightist Elements To The End”, the second included a warning: “Hygiene Workers Cannot 
Stray From Party Leadership”. The third editorial reminded the Chinese people of their revolutionary 
spirit by referring to bayi, the term used for the battle fought between the Communists and the 
Kuomintang in Nanchang in 1927 (CMJ, 1957: 8). Two months later, the CMJ encouraged the medical 
community to “actively participate in the battle against the rightists”, and to “accept education to 
develop socialist thought” (CMJ, 1957: 10).  
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5.5 The Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) 
In 1958, Mao launched his next great mass campaign, the Great Leap Forward (da yue jin). This is one 
of the most widely known political campaigns of China, not in the last place because of its disastrous 
outcome. The launch of the Great Leap Forward was the result of a combination of economic and 
ideological factors. The Second Five Year-Plan of the CCP started in 1958 and one of its main focus 
points was industry. This had already been an important focus of the First Five Year-Plan, but the 
results had not been overwhelming. The Five Year-Plan used the Soviet model of development. 
According to this model, agricultural surplus could be used to invest in heavy industry. In the case of 
China, however, there was not that much agricultural surplus to begin with. The increased output of 
grain coincided with an increased population. At the same time, the grain surpluses that were available 
were reserved to be used for the repayment of loans provided by the Soviet Union earlier. For that 
reason, a grain requisition program was already started in 1953 (Chen, 2009: 59-61). Mao realized the 
Chinese lack of capital, but found a creative solution. He decided to supplement the shortage of capital 
with something he had in abundance: labour. A successful water conservancy project, carried out 
through mobilization of the people during the winter of 1957-1958, convinced him that Chinese 
manpower would be able to make up for the missing capital (MacFarquhar et al., 1989: 15).  The 
government started rapid and massive collectivization by organizing the Chinese people into people’s 
communes. These communes functioned as complete living environments where their inhabitants ate, 
slept and worked together on industrial projects, the most notorious being steel production (Mao had 
bluntly declared that the PRC would overtake the UK as the largest steel producer in 1957).   
The Great Leap Forward also had a clear ideological element. The giant undertaking would mean that 
the PRC would get much closer to its ideal of a communist society. This prospect, amplified through 
the extensive use of propaganda, excited the people to the point where they voluntarily handed over 
all steel objects in their own possession to contribute to the industrial development of their country. 
This emotional investment in the Great Leap Forward again shows the CCP’s proficient use of emotion 
work.  
Several factors contributed to the famines that lead to the starvation of millions of Chinese. First of all, 
the people’s communes did not function as Mao had hoped. The diversion of labour and peasants 
enthusiastically participating in industrialization projects left too little manpower to tend to the 
harvests. The giant mess halls where the peasants ate a good meal three times a day took away the 
need to produce one’s own meal. As the land was no longer their own, there was hardly any incentive 
for peasants to continue to work in the fields, leaving the crops to their fate. Next to this disinterest, 
some of the policies implemented by the government had terrible consequences. The War Against the 
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Four Pests unbalanced ecosystems and close planting methods caused crops not to grow well. 
Although these circumstances might have alarmed watchful participants, instead the emotion work 
succeeded in continuously sparking up enthusiasm that caused officials and peasants to exaggerate 
harvests. Reports about record productions of grain and crops caused officials to fabricate even more 
glowing reports. Unfortunately, higher reported harvests meant higher requisition quota. This left less 
to eat for local populations. This combination of requisition, CCP policies and human errors resulted in 
a disastrous ending of the Great Leap Forward, with famines in 1960 and 1961 that led to the starvation 
of millions of Chinese (Chen, 2009). After other high-ranking government officials intervened, the 
Great Leap Forward was brought to a halt in early 1962. Under the guidance of Liu Shaoqi and Deng 
Xiaoping, the government substituted the highly ideological political course for a more practical one, 
focusing on famine relief and on restarting the economy and everyday life. Mao retired from the 
political spotlight, but only until 1966, when he commenced the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.  
5.6 Reflections in the Chinese Medical Journal 
The enthusiastic spirit of the Great Leap Forward found its way into the CMJ. Some articles actively 
encouraged the medical community to take part in industrial and technological strides forward, others 
emphasize the importance of labour and workplace hygiene. Purely medical articles are a good 
reflection of the activity in steel production: the first three editions of 1959 all feature a special on the 
treatment of severe burns (CMJ, 1959: 1-3). The enthusiasm and exaggeration are visible too, 
especially in the English version. In 1959 and 1960 the CMJ included a total of 18 indirectly political 
articles. These articles all hail recent advancements in medicine in China. Titles of these articles include 
“Maternity and Child Welfare in People’s Communes”, “Advances of Clinical Haematology in New 
China”, or “Achievements in Ophthalmology in New China” and usually start with praising Mao and the 
Party before describing the latest progress (CMJ, 1959:6; CMJ, 1960: 1).  
The reversal of medical policy surrounding Chinese medicine as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
devaluation of intellectuals and Western medicine as a result of the Anti-Rightist Movement and the 
desire to incorporate the wisdom of the masses into medicine all led to the renewed interest in folk 
remedies and traditional Chinese healing practices. This interest is confirmed in the CMJ. The 
percentage of articles on Chinese medicine as part of the total number of articles is at its highest during 
the years of the Great Leap Forward, more than doubling between 1957 and 1958 (See Chapter 2). 
These articles show the enthusiastic and perhaps over-the-top research into the possibilities of Chinese 
medicine, including a 1958 article about the use of Chinese medicine to treat liver cirrhosis and a 1959 
article about using acupuncture to treat deafness (CMJ, 1958: 7; CMJ, 1959: 1). 
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5.7 Ideological radicalization and policy shifts 
Looking at political mass campaigns as separate events shows the direct translation of these campaigns 
into the medical community. But by taking a step back and viewing the campaigns as part of a larger 
shift in China’s political course, the role ideological radicalization played in this shift becomes more 
apparent. To guide the discussion of policy shifts in China, I rely on the theory about policy shifts 
Richard Suttmeier puts forth in his book “Research and Revolution”. This theory fits well within the 
Marxist dialectical narrative of continuous struggle. According to Suttmeier, a state has a specific set 
of large goals. In order to reach those goals, it first needs to reach a large variety of smaller goals. In 
state 1A, a government is busy attaining some of those smaller goals. As soon as those goals are 
reached, the government transforms into state 1B. After arriving at state 1B, however, the government 
realizes that not all  smaller goals were fulfilled, rendering it impossible to achieve the larger goals. To 
achieve the other smaller goals needed to get to the larger goals, something needs to change. This 
change is a policy shift. After the policy shift, the government has reached state 2A and the cycle of 
reaching some and failing to reach other goals starts again, followed by yet another policy shift. In the 
case of China, the period between state 1A and state 1B can be regarded as a period of liberalism or 
regularization. The period between state 1B and state 2A is a period of radicalization or mobilization. 
Suttmeier also gives two important characteristics of the policy shifts. Firstly, policy shifts come with 
political conflicts. Secondly, ideology is the compass that decides the exact moment a policy shift 
should take place (Suttmeier, 1974: 30).  
Following Suttmeier, we can see clear periods of regularization and mobilization (and therefore policy 
shifts) in China between 1949 and 1962.  
The first shift is embodied by the start of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, but there were signs a change 
was about to come a few years earlier already. Mao recognized the disappointing economic situation. 
In order to promote a debate about economics and society, he invoked the Hundred Flowers Campaign, 
where the country’s intelligentsia could speak their mind. However, the popular response to the 
Hundred Flowers Campaign was so critical of the CCP that Mao instead decided to take a ‘left turn’ and 
opted for strict ideological correctness and the mass line as guiding principles (Croizier, 1968: 186). 
Although he had already tried collectivization in 1956 during the failed ‘Socialist High Tide’, the 
Hundred Flowers Campaign confirmed his notion that the masses and correct ideology were the only 
possible way forward. Being a communist in heart and soul and strictly adhering to Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy were the most important. Those who were not red, or not red enough, were subjected to 
thought reform or sent to labour camps during the Anti Rightist Campaign.  
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This notion of ‘redness’ being more important than anything did not sit well with everyone in the 
government. More pragmatic Party leaders like Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi believed that the 
expertise of scientists and other intellectuals could not simply be replaced by manpower. This led to a 
political conflict that can be summarized as ‘Red versus Expert’. In the period building up to the Great 
Leap Forward, the ‘expert’ side suggested a more practical approach to economic growth, while the 
‘reds’ accused the experts of bourgeois tendencies and a lack of a proper ideological foundation, calling 
them white experts (baizhuan). With the commencement of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, the 
experts had definitively lost. However, by the time the Great Leap Forward had led to the largest 
famines ever recorded in modern history, the tables had turned again. Even though the Great Leap 
Forward had obviously failed, Mao still believed that ideological correctness was more important than 
factual correctness, while the expert camp, represented by Deng and Liu, believed that higher wages 
and bonuses would work better than any moral incentives for rebuilding the country. The more 
practical leaders who were able to force Mao to temporary retreat from the political stage, allowed 
the intellectuals who had suffered so greatly to return and help rebuild the country. The intellectuals, 
so believed Deng and Liu, would bring political stability and would do the job effectively. To them, this 
was more important than their political colour (Baum, 1964: 1057). Deng’s famous remark “It doesn’t 
matter if a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice” is a nice summary of this sentiment.  
The policy shifts in China between 1949 and 1962 can be reproduced in a schematic view: 
 
Two periods of regularization were alternated with a period of mobilization. This period of mobilization 
was ushered in by the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great Leap Forward. With the end of the Great 
Leap Forward, the new period of regularization begins, characterized by a desire to repair the damage 
of the Great Leap. The overarching ideological debate that determines the moments of policy shift is 
the continuous struggle between the more radical reds and the less radical, more practical experts.  
 
Regularization (1949-1956)  Mobilization (1957-1961) 
Regularization (1962-1965)
Anti Rightist Campaign and Great 
Leap Forward
"A cat should catch mice"
Red versus
Expert
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6. Sino-Soviet Relations, 1949-1962 
The development of the relationship between China and the Soviet Union is a very complicated matter. 
This chapter alone cannot do it justice, but it does provide enough information to form an idea about 
the general trajectory of the relationship.  
Less than a year after the CCP founded the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the PRC 
signed a Treaty of Alliance, Friendship and Mutual Assistance. The Treaty, signed by Zhou Enlai on 
behalf of the PRC, was meant to secure cooperation and military assistance when deemed necessary. 
According to Lüthi, it was no wonder that Stalin and Mao sought to forge close ties. Both were devoted 
communists, sharing an ideology. Both were anti-imperialists but supported the idea of world 
revolution. Furthermore, they both headed political parties that had risen to power after a long armed 
struggle (Lüthi, 2010: 31-33). However, practical considerations for rapprochement should not be 
overlooked either. A treaty served both countries: China received protection from the perceived 
imperialist United States and received aid and assistance to rebuild the country. Stalin, in turn, finally 
received concessions in Manchuria he had been eyeing for years (Vámos, 2010: 136).  
6.1 Soviet assistance 
Although both officially committed to the Sino-Soviet relationship by signing the Treaty, the 
relationship itself was by no means equal. The PRC was in its infancy, but the Soviets already were a 
long way further down the road towards socialism. For that reason, the Chinese adopted Soviet 
development models for the economy, education, the military and other fields. The ‘Learn from the 
Soviet Union’ policy was supposed to jumpstart the ideologically correct rebuilding of China after years 
of destruction due to armed conflict. With the development models came other types of assistance, 
like assistance of economic and military kind. Lüthi estimates (2008: 40) that the Chinese government 
borrowed between 1,413 and 1,52 billion roubles from the Soviet Union to get the Chinese economy 
up and running again. Furthermore, Soviet experts arrived in China to set up somewhere between 300 
and 360 industrial projects. An example of one of these projects is the planting of rubber trees. The 
Soviet Union suffered from a shortage of rubber, so it encouraged China to start engaging in the 
planting of rubber trees. The harvest was exported to the Soviet Union. The rubber tree-industry was 
so successful, that it was one of the highest priorities of the first economic Five Year Plan (Zhang, J., 
2013: 34; Lüthi, 2008: 39-40). The Chinese military was restructured along the lines of the Red Army. 
Restructuring was necessary because of the military threat the United States posed to the PRC. The 
People’s Liberation Army was a revolutionary army, equipped for guerrilla warfare. Soviet military 
advisors guided a transformation towards a more professional, modern army by implementing Soviet 
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model force regularization and by allowing the PRC to purchase Soviet military equipment like 
weapons, ships and airplanes (You, 2010: 131-133).  
6.2 Scientific exchange 
Next to Soviet assistance in rebuilding the economy and restructuring the military, the PRC and Soviet 
Union engaged in scientific exchange. Between 1949 and 1960, there were an estimated 10,000 non-
military Soviet (Bloc) advisors in China. These advisors, or specialists, concerned themselves not only 
with industrial projects to boost the Chinese economy like mentioned above, but also with the 
development of science and technology. The Soviet Union and China realized that scientific exchange 
would be mutually beneficial. The Chinese knew that the Soviet Union had already developed the type 
of socialist, ideologically correct science they desired as well. For the Soviet Union, scientific exchange 
with China meant more access and more manpower to deploy (Gakhman, 2010: 281-282). Scientific 
and technological exchange took many forms. There was written exchange, but also the exchange of 
personnel. Young Chinese scientists were trained in the Soviet Union and Soviet academic personnel 
came to China to conduct joint research with native researchers (Zhang, J., 2013: 36). 
Exchange between the Soviet and Chinese Academies of Science and the construction of the Twelve 
Year Science Plan are great examples of the extent of scientific exchange between the Soviet Union 
and PRC. The Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) was established only a month after the People’s 
Republic, in November 1949. The Academy was tasked with both carrying out research and 
coordination of universities and industrial research groups. By 1954, the CAS was in need of 
restructuring: The First Five Year Plan had come out and the Academy found itself ill-equipped to 
perform the advisory role expected by the government. With help from Soviet advisors, the CAS took 
on the administrative structure of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.  After the restructuring, exchange 
between the Academies of Science, students and professors intensified (Gakhman, 2010: 283).  
The Twelve Year Science Plan, officially called ‘The Outline of a Long Term Plan for the Development 
of Science and Technology’, provides insight about the fields of research that were to be given priority 
in China. The Twelve Year Science Plan was drafted between 1956 and 1957, heavily influenced by 
economic plans. It was supposed to serve as a blueprint for the next stage of industrialization and the 
associated scientific research (Wang, Z., 2015: 180). Although it was never officially published, there 
are some fields of industry and research that received more attention around this time. These projects 
included atomic energy for peaceful uses, jet propulsion, power equipment and heavy machinery and 
the prevention and eradication of detrimental diseases (Suttmeier, 1974: 59-61). The projects 
mentioned in the Twelve Year Science Plan were the projects worked on most by the Chinese scientists 
and Soviet advisors.  
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6.3 Ideological conflict: economic development and destalinization 
By 1956, the first cracks in the seemingly stable relationship between the Soviet Union and the People’s 
Republic became visible in the form of developing ideological conflict. This ideological conflict was 
rooted in disagreements over China’s economic development and ‘destalinization’ in the Soviet Union. 
These disagreements were deepened further by other factors. Ultimately, the ideological conflict led 
to the withdrawal of the Soviet experts working in China in 1960. 
During the earliest years of the PRC, the CCP government practiced a mixed economic system. Many 
of the major industries were state-owned, but others were still owned by private parties. In 1953, the 
CCP felt ready to make the change from a mixed economy into a fully planned economy. Consequently, 
it developed and implemented the first Five Year Plan. This plan was modelled after and approved by 
the Soviet Union, focusing on heavy industry. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Soviet 
development model assumed that agricultural surpluses should be used to invest in heavy industry. 
The main problem lay within the fact that China did not possess those surpluses. The Soviet Union 
offered to supplement the shortages by additional loans. This would mean even heavier loan 
repayments in the future, and have negative consequences for China in the long-term. Mao refused 
and set out to find an economic alternative. He had always been drawn to a more radical form of 
development, characterized by rapid collectivization. While still alive, Stalin repeatedly warned Mao 
against too radical a course, pointing to the terrible famines in the Soviet Union when the Communist 
Party there attempted the very same thing some thirty years earlier (Levine, 2010: 132). The Soviet 
Union instead encouraged Mao to continue on the relatively moderate but steady course of 
development, much to the Chairman’s dismay. This festering disagreement over economic 
development was exacerbated to a great extent when Nikita Khrushchev became the leader of the 
Soviet Union after Stalin’s death. Despite disagreeing from time to time, Mao and Stalin had a 
functioning working relationship. The death of Stalin meant, in the eyes of Mao, that the playing field 
of the world socialist camp was levelled out again. He believed himself, and China for that matter, no 
longer inferior to the Soviet Union. However, Khrushchev seemed to assume that he would take on 
Stalin’s leading role in the socialist world overnight. This did not sit well with Mao, who happened to 
harbour a personal dislike of Khrushchev as well. That feeling was mutual (Stiffler, 2010: 320).  
Then Khrushchev gave his famous Secret Speech on February 25, 1956 during the 20th CPSU congress. 
In this speech, Khrushchev pleaded for what is now understood as destalinization, and in practice 
meant a slight liberalisation of politics. Khrushchev also attacked Stalin’s cult of personality. This made 
Mao feel uneasy. Criticism of Stalin’s personality cult especially hit home for Mao, who had started to 
build a cult of personality of his own (Bernstein, 2010: 15; Lüthi, 2010: 39). To make matters worse, 
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the Soviet Union had started to seek rapprochement with the United States, something that Mao 
considered a betrayal of the Marxist-Leninist anti-imperialist worldview (Vámos, 2010: 138). The 
disagreements over economic development and the Soviet Union’s perceived apostasy caused Mao to 
re-evaluate his ‘Learn from the Soviet Union’ philosophy. He, and other politicians like Zhou Enlai, 
realized that China had started to become overdependent on the Soviet Union. This caused him to 
start to actively promote “self-reliance” (You, 2010: 135; Bernstein, 2010: 14). Mao also once more 
became convinced to turn away from liberalisation. His faith in radical leftist policies was strengthened 
by destalinization and the results of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, which proved to him that 
liberalisation posed a severe threat to the stability of the PRC, and that ideological radicalism was the 
only possible way forward.  
6.4 Additional tension and the withdrawal of Soviet advisors 
Although the biggest part of Sino-Soviet tensions and the following rift in the Sino-Soviet relationship 
can be attributed to Mao’s annoyance with the ideological course of the Soviet Union, vexation did 
come from both sides. A Soviet source of irritation was the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958. Mao 
ordered the shelling of Jinmen Island without giving Soviet Union any prior warning. This was especially 
bothersome to the Soviets because the incident put tension on Soviet attempts at rapprochement with 
the United States (Lüthi, 2010: 42). Furthermore, the scientific exchange between China and the Soviet 
Union was not as mutually beneficial as previously hoped. Over the course of 1957, Soviet scientists 
started to complain that the Chinese parties were not very forthcoming in terms of sharing information. 
The fact that the largest contribution from the PRC was for Soviet research into Chinese history and 
Sinology shows how little of the research on the priority-topics (as stated in the Twelve Year Science 
Plan) was actively shared by the Chinese. The latter clearly viewed the ‘exchange’ as a one-way street 
(Gakhman, 2010: 288-289).  
Mutual annoyances culminated into the withdrawal of the Soviet advisors and specialists from China 
in 1960. According to Lüthi (2008: 174), reasons for this decision by Khrushchev included Chinese 
criticism of the specialists’ work, purposefully ignoring Soviet advice and a surge of anti-CPSU 
propaganda, originating from the Chinese government. After the withdrawal of the Soviet specialists, 
the relationship between the two countries slightly normalized again. When the Chinese countryside 
experienced disastrous famines as a result of the Great Leap Forward, the Soviet Union did provide 
food aid. However, Mao continued his criticism of Khrushchev and the Soviet Union in the years to 
come, for example in “On Khrushchev’s Phony Communism” of 1964.  
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6.5 Reflections in the CMJ 
Considered one of the fields of priority for scientific research, the Soviet influence in medicine is rather 
noticeable in the Chinese Medical Journal, although both versions paint a slightly different picture. In 
the Chinese version of the CMJ, Soviet influence is mostly visible through articles on Russian or Soviet 
medical theories. These theories include painless childbirth, nutrition treatment and tissue therapy. 
However, articles on those topics are easily outnumbered by articles on Pavlovian theory. Between 
1953 and 1958, the Chinese CMJ published 10 articles and book reviews based on Pavlovian physiology. 
In the English version of the CMJ, medical articles on Soviet science are not that numerous. Painless 
childbirth is mentioned a few times (CMJ, 1953), but references to Soviet science mostly occur in 
political editorials. In July 1953, October 1956 and November 1957, the English CMJ published articles 
with phrases like “Learn from Advanced Soviet Science” or “Learn from the Soviet Union” in their titles. 
Interestingly enough, the content of the articles refers only to the need to learn from the advanced 
Soviet Union: It provides hardly any specification of what it is exactly that should be learned. This again 
raises the notion that the English version  of the CMJ is used to send clear political signals into the 
outside world.  
The development and deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, especially in the field of science, can also 
be noted when looking at both versions of the CMJ. The English version of the Journal shows how 
important medical exchange was around 1953, when five articles on the Soviet Union were published 
in the journal. Although the tone in articles on the Soviet Union does not change over time, the number 
of articles does. After 1953, there are only three articles involving the Soviet Union published in the 
English version of the CMJ. The last one is published in 1960 and until the end of 1965, the Soviet Union 
is not mentioned again. Interestingly enough, the Chinese version of the CMJ shows a similar pattern. 
In 1953, 17,39% of all CMJ articles referred to the Soviet Union or to Soviet medical theory. By 1958, 
this percentage had dropped to 0,88% (See Chapter 2).  
 
 
 
  
36 
 
7. Conclusion 
This thesis centred on medicine policy in China from 1949 to 1962, a time period roughly corresponding 
with the foundation of the PRC and the end of the Great Leap Forward. Specifically, the aim of this 
thesis was to find out if there are grounds to assume that the deteriorating relationship between the 
PRC and the Soviet Union has been a cause for the reversal of PRC medicine policy that took place in 
the 1950s. Clues for this idea can be found in the work of academics, who assume that Mao often used 
international politics to set the national political agenda. The first part of the thesis was concerned 
with establishing whether or not there truly was such a policy reversal. An overview of literature on 
this subject, as well as an analysis of the Chinese and English versions of the leading Chinese Medical 
Journal have shown that such a policy shift did indeed take place. 
The second part of the thesis has provided the necessary political context needed to fully grasp the 
underlying political motives and trends that influenced policy change on the specific terrain of 
medicine. The third part of the thesis delved into Sino-Soviet cooperation, specifically cooperation in 
the field of science and technology. It also discussed some of the reasons offered by scholarly literature 
for the deterioration of the relationship that culminated in the withdrawal of Soviet specialists from 
China in 1960. Causes for the decline of Sino-Soviet relations can be united under the term ‘ideology’. 
Ideological differences over the correct economic development in China between the PRC and the 
Soviet Union, as well as the process of destalinization in the USSR were the two causes that drove Mao 
in the direction of ideological radicalization.  
In his theory on policy shifts in China, Richard Suttmeier describes alternating periods of regularization 
and mobilization. A shift from regularization to mobilization or the other way around takes place 
whenever societal experimentation is needed to reach the goals a certain state has. The shift touches 
upon several policy areas at the same time. The exact moment of policy change is determined by 
ideology. In the case of the policy shift in the mid-1950s’, the original economic model had run its 
course. A change in policy was needed to boost China’s economy: economic prosperity would enable 
the PRC to accelerate the transition towards socialism. Khrushchev’s Secret Speech proved to Mao that 
liberalization would be dangerous for his position as China’s leader. This pointed him to the opposite 
direction, towards a course of radicalization. Furthermore, Mao decided to adjust his ‘Learn from the 
Soviet Union’ slogan into a notion of ‘self-reliance’. China’s indigenous medicine could serve as an 
excellent example of the longstanding Chinese capability for self-reliance. In this regard, it is no wonder 
that Chinese medicine entered the spotlight when regard for the Soviet Union started to wane. The 
analysis of the CMJ, which points to an increase in content on Chinese medicine and a decrease of 
Soviet Union-related content within the same timeframe, confirms this finding. Findings in literature 
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and the CMJ-analysis show that it can be argued that changing Sino-Soviet relations as a consequence 
of ideological disagreements have played a role in the mid-1950s policy shift towards ideological 
radicalization. This policy shift covered not only economic policy, but also medicine policy.  
However, the extent of influence of Sino-Soviet relations on the mid-1950s policy shift should not be 
overestimated. Political developments on the Chinese national stage might also have played a major 
role. The Hundred Flowers Campaign, meant to encourage debate on China’s development, turned 
into full blown criticism of the ruling CCP. This surprised and threatened Mao, who foresaw threats to 
the stability of the PRC. He followed the Hundred Flowers Campaign with the Anti-Rightist Movement 
to silence the critics.  While intellectuals were prosecuted and sent to labour camps, Mao embarked 
on the course towards the Great Leap Forward. The overarching ideological debate at the base of these 
campaigns, was a debate between reds and experts. The shift from regularization to mobilization that 
commenced with the Anti-Rightist Movement and the start of the Great Leap Forward reflect a victory 
of the red camp. When the Great Leap ended in 1961 and a new period of regularization began, the 
experts temporarily took over the reign of the PRC.  
Apart from political developments both abroad and in China, the personal abilities of Mao himself 
should not be disregarded. Given his need for self-preservation and obvious talent for manipulation, 
the possibility that Mao only employed changing Sino-Soviet relations for his own personal gain is not 
out of the question. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis serves as an example of Mao’s ability to frame 
international events for his own use. 
This thesis has shown that a change in medical policy in China coincided with a change in Sino-Soviet 
relations. Indications that the two are in relation with each other stem from ideological disagreements 
between the two countries, followed by a Chinese change of course. This research is too limited to 
draw any conclusions as to the extent of the influence of Sino-Soviet relations on policy change, but it 
might offer a starting point for other academics to investigate this subject further.  
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8. Appendix 1: Table of Contents of a Chinese Medical Journal (Chinese  
version) 
 
Appendix 2: A page from the Chinese version of the Chinese Medical Journal 
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9.2 Chinese Medical Journal sources 
 
 English version:     Chinese version:  
 
 
 
 
Year Volume Issues 
1949 67 1-6 
1953 71 1-6 
1954 72 1-6 
1956 74 7-12 
1957 75 1-12 
1958 76 1-6 
1959 78 1-6 
1960 79 1-6 
1962 81 1-12 
1963 82 1-12 
1964 83 1-12 
1965 84 1-12 
Year Volume Issues 
1953 39 7,9 
1954 40 1,5,7-12 
1955 41 1,2,4,6-12 
1956 42 1-12 
1957 43 1-12 
1958 44 1,3-12 
1962 48 7-12 
